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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY EARLEY, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
KARL L. JACKS·ON, 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
7725 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages sustained by 
the plaintiff in an automobile accident that occurred on 
Utah State Highway No. 3 near Laketown, Utah, on the 
evening of April 3, 1950. The defendant, Merne V. 
Muder, was never served with summons and the action 
was tried against the defendant, Karl L. Jackson, alone. 
Judgment was rendered against the defendant, Jackson, 
and in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant, Jackson, 
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
which was denied by the court. The appeal is from the 
judgment and from the denial of the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
The case was submitted to the jury by the trial court 
on the question of the negligence of the defendant, the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff, and proximate 
cause. The def~ndant contended, in the lower court, as he 
does here, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence which precluded his recovery. The plaintiff 
contended that the negligence of the defendant was the 
sole proximate cause of the accident. The case was sub-
mitted to the jury under appropriate instructions, from 
which the defendant has not appealed, and the jury by 
its verdict found that the negligence of the defendant was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
The only question presented by this appeal is, there-
fore, whether there was sufficient evidence from which 
the jury could determine that the negligence of the de-
fendant was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
THE FACTS 
For the most part the facts as set forth by the appel-
lant in his brief are correct, but do not present the· situ-
ation in full from the respondent's standpoint. We will, 
therefore, make our own statement of the facts as we 
deem them material to our presentation of the case. 
The accident occurred on April 3, 1950, at about 
7:00-7:30 P.M., (R. 98), on Utah State Highway No.3, 
(R. 99), approximately one-half a mile or more west of 
Laketown, Utah, (R. 125). The weather was clear. It 
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'Yas dark. The visibility ""as good and there 'vas no fog 
or 1nist, ( R. 98, 109, 181, 199, 265). The high,vay pro-
ceeded in a general easterly and ""esterly direction, (R. 
99), and 'Yas an oiled road approximately 20-21 feet in 
w·idth, (R. 162). Near the point ""here the accident oc-
curred a creek running north and south crosses under the 
high,Yay in a culvert, (R. 99, 100). There was a gradual 
drop of about 6 or 7 feet from the high,vay down to the 
creek bed, (R. 104, 170). The road was straight and 
practically level for a distance of a half a mile west of 
the culvert at which point the· highway curved to the 
north, (R. 100-101). It was also straight and level for a 
considerable distance east of the culvert, (R. 100). There 
,,,.as testimony that the shoulders on either side of the 
highway were approximately 3-4 feet in width, (R. 101), 
although this is not indicated by Exhibit 2 which was 
introduced in evidence by the defendant to show the high-
way at the scene. There was testimony that there were 
guard posts in place at the scene of the accident, and 
one of the witnesses testified that these guard posts were 
located at the edge of the hard surfaced portion of the 
road, (R. 163). There was other evidence that the guard 
posts were located at the edges of the shoulders, ( R. 
103). There was testimony that it had rained in the after-
noon and that the highway was damp at the time of the 
accident, (R. 98). One witness testified that the high-
way was fairly dry, (R. 199), and one of the defendant's 
'vi tnesses testified that there was a thin coating of ice 
on the road, (R. 239). The photograph, Exhibit 2, was 
introduced in evidence, looking east along the highway 
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and showing the guard posts referred to by the witnesses. 
A Ford one-half ton pick-up truck, (R. 105), which 
the plaintiff Earley had been operating was parked on 
the highway over the culvert headed northwest with the 
front end thereof about a foot south of the center line, 
(R. 106, 178, 210). The rear wheels were on the south 
shoulder 2 or 3 fe~t off the oiled portion of the road 
with the rear of the bed of the truck sticking out over 
the edge of the culvert, (R. 106). It was stipulated be-
tween the parties that the truck which the plaintiff had 
been operating was 13lh feet from the front bumper to 
the furtherest rear portion of the rear tire and that the 
overall length of the truck from the front bumper to 
extreme rear portion of the bed of the truck was 15% 
feet, (R. 215). The headlights on the Earley truck were 
burning, (R. 111, 112, 268, 269). 
At the time of the accident the plaintiff was running 
down the north edge of the highway in a westerly di-
rection waving his arms to warn the defendant's driver 
who was proceeding east along the south side of the 
highway toward the plaintiff's truck, (R. 111). There was 
evidence that the plaintiff was 100-150 feet west of the 
culvert, (R. 112, 146), and as close to the north edge of 
the road as he could get, (R. 153-154). The plaintiff 
testified that he could not very well have got entirely 
off the the oiled portion of the road at that point, (R. 
14 7). He further testified that there was at least 8 feet 
between him and the center line on the north side of the 
oiled portion of the road at the time of the accident, (R. 
157). An examination of Exhibit 2 would confirm the 
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plaintiff's contention that he could not very well get en-
tirely off the oiled portion of the road. Plaintiff testi-
fied that he heard the brakes screech on the defendant's 
vehicle and that 'vas the last thing he remembered, (R. 
112). He testified that by his presence he had not blocked 
the north half of the road, ( R. 1-±5) ; that he didn't kno\v 
that the defendant's vehicle \vould have to turn to the left 
but expected that it would stop as it could have done, (R. 
1-!G). He further testified on re-direct examination that 
he knew the position of the truck on the highway created 
a hazard if someone came up th~ road at a high rate of 
speed and 'vasn't \Yatching where he was going, but he 
did not feel that his presence on the north edge of the 
high,vay created a dangerous situation, (R. 157-158). 
Earley was knocked or carried into the creek and follow-
ing the accident was brought out of the creek by the wit-
ness Willis, (R. 230, 278, 279). 
Roland Reese, a State Highway Patrolman, testified 
that he investigated the accident a day or two following 
its occurrence; that neither vehicle was present on the 
scene at that time, (R. 161). He stated that he observed 
some skid marks on the highway in the vicinity of the 
culvert. These marks at the west end were about in the 
middle of the highway, (R. 165); that they proceeded 
for a distance of 114 feet 6 inches to the east at which 
point they left the oiled portion of the highway; that 
there \vere 30 more feet of skid marks on the north 
shoulder, (R. 164); that the marks on the shoulder indi-
cated that the vehicle was skidding sideways, (R. 165-
166), as it went over the culvert tearing up the gravel; 
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that there was no physical evidence from which he could 
deter1nine the position the plaintiff occupied on the high-
way at the time of the accident, (R. 167). 
Harold Johnson testified that he arrived on the scene 
of the accident at about 8 :00 P.M. on the evening of the 
accident, (R. 175); that he saw the lights on the two ve-
hicles involved in the accident when the car in which he 
was riding was about one-half a mile to the east, (R. 176) ; 
that he was present on the scene when they pulled the 
plaintiff out of the creek, (R. 177); that the truck oper-
ated by the plaintiff was on the south side of the highway 
leaning a little to the west of north with its lights burning 
with the front bumper of the pick-up almost to the center 
line, (R. 178). He observed the defendant's truck in a 
slough, (R. 179), about 40 feet east of the culvert and 
about 10-12 feet north of the highway. It was headed 
south, (R. 179, 180) ; that he heard Muder, the defendant's 
employee, say: "I was driving awful fast, and I hit him 
awful hard and I'm afraid he is dead." (R. 183). He also 
heard Muder say that he had not seen the Earley truck 
at all but just saw the man out waving his hands, (R. 
184, 186); that the defendant's truck had not come in con-
tact with the truck which had been operated by the plain-
tiff at all, (R. 187) ; that he observed some skid marks 
on the highway extending over to the point where the 
defendant's vehicle came to rest; that they started about 
100 feet west of the culvert and kind of zig zagged; that 
as they got close to the culvert it looked as though the car 
turned sideways and started to skid sideways about 20 
or 25 feet west of the culvert where the rear wheels went 
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off onto the north shoulder and n1ade n1arks in the gravel 
over the rulYert to the point 'Yhere the defendant's ve-
hicle rolled back, Yards into the slough, (R. 186). 
Harold Johnson also testified that he observ:~d the 
plaintiff's hat and glove on the north shoulder of the 
road, (R. lSS), about 100 feet 'Yest of the culvert 'vhere 
the first tracks 'Yere visible, (R. 187). 
Farrell Johnson, another 'vi tness, testified that he 
had been tra\eling east along the high,vay and arrived 
on the scene of the accident, (R. 195); that he observed 
the Earley truck; that its lights were burning, and he had 
seen the lights when he turned the bend a half a mile west 
of the truck, (R. 196); that the Earley truck was facing 
slightly northwest because he saw the lights when he 
made the bend, (R. 196, 197); that he drove over the cul-
vert past the Earley truck without difficulty and with-
out leaving the paved portion of the highway, (R. 197) ; 
that he observed the defendant's truck in the slough on 
the north side of the road facing the highway about 25 
feet east of the culvert with its front end 8 feet north of 
the paved road, (R. 198) ; that later that evening he 
made observations at the scene and followed tracks from 
the point where the defendant's vehicle was in the slough 
to the west until he could see them no longer; that they 
started approximately 100 feet or maybe a little more 
west of the culvert, (R. 202), and went diagonally across 
the road until they reached a point approximately oppo-
site where the Earley truck was sitting where the tracks 
indicated that the hind wheels had swung around onto the 
shoulder of the road; that the tracks continued east until 
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the truck lost its momentum and evidently skidded back-
wards into the slough, (R. 203); that he found Earley's 
glove lying on the north shoulder of the highway and his 
hat a few feet from it on the ground about 50-75 feet west 
of the culvert, (R. 204). 
Lola Johnson, wife of Harold Johnson, also testified 
that the Earley truck was headed in a diagonal north-
westerly direction, (R. 210); that after they stopped on 
the scene she ran down the orange line in the center of 
the road beyond the truck and that the truck was to her 
left as she was running west and she did not come in 
contact with it so that it was all south of the center line, 
(R. 210-211); that she saw black skidding marks on the 
oil and a furrough dug along the road in the gravel on 
the north shoulder; that she could not tell where the fur-
rough in the gravel was with reference to the point where 
the creek crossed under the highway, (R. 212); that she 
heard the defendant's employee, Muder, say that he 
couldn't believe that Earley was alive because he had hit 
him so hard, (R. 214). 
Sherman Lutz, who at that time was Deputy Sheriff 
of Rich County, testified that he was notified of the acci-
dent about 10:05 P.M., (R. 217), and the following morn-
ing made an investigation; that from where the defend-
ant's car came to rest in the slough he observed skid 
marks extending to the west for a total distance of 144 
feet 6 inches, (R. 218); that from the point where the 
marks first started at the west to the point where they 
left the oiled road on the north was 130 feet; that at the 
west end the marks started on the south side of the high-
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way in the lane for eastbound traffic; that there were t'ro 
sets of marks, one caused by each of the \vheels, and that 
both sets at the 'vest end 'vere in the lane for eastbound 
traffic, ( R. 219) : that according to the marks the car 
traveled approximately 10 feet in the eastbound lane be-
fore turning to the north, ( R. 220) ; that the defendant's 
truck stopped about 1:2 feet east of the culvert north of 
the high,vay facing south, (R. 222). 
Elijah C. \\Tillis testified that he lived about 1000 
feet northwest of the culvert, (R. 228); that 'vhile at 
home he noticed a car parked on the highway with the 
lights toward his house; that he walked fro1n his home 
towards the car; that when he was about 300 or 400 feet 
away from the culvert he observed the defendant's vehicle 
coming from the west, (R. 229); that it was about at 
the bend in the road approximately one-half a mile away, 
(R. 231) ; that he could hear the engine as it was making 
a lot of noise at that time, (R. 235) ; that he did not see 
the accident but pulled the plaintiff out of the creek and 
thought he was dead, (R. 230); that he observed a hat 
and one glove about on the edge of the oiled road at 
a guard post approximately 45 feet west of where Mr. 
Earley was in the creek, (R. 233). He admitted having 
given a signed statement to Mr. Burns, one of the defend-
ant's attorneys, in which he said: "When I was about 200 
feet from the highway and as the moving truck was about 
50-100 feet from the parked truck I heard a man yell and 
I also heard the truck hit something, and I thought that 
the truck had hit one of the guard posts." ( R. 239). 
Merne V. Muder, the defendant's employee, testified 
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that he was operating the defendant's 1948 three-quarter 
ton Chevrolet pick-up truck at the time of the accident, 
(R. 251), with the headlights burning on high beam, (R. 
253); that he was traveling in an easterly direction along 
the highway at a speed of 45-50 miles per hour, (R. 266, 
267); that the road was straight for a half a mile west 
of the culvert, (R. 253); that he had driven over the high-
way many times before and was thoroughly familiar with 
it, (R. 252) ; that when he rounded the curve one-half 
a mile west of the culvert, he observed the lights at Lake-
town and also the lights on a vehicle which was parked 
by a pool hall in Laketown, (R. 254-255) ; that Laketown 
was located about a half a mile east of the culvert, (R. 
252). 
"Q. Now when you rounded the curve and enter 
that straight stretch you had no difficulty in-
sofar as your visibility was concerned in see-
ing the lights of an automobile clear over by 
a pool hall in Laketown, about a mile away? 
That is correct, isn't it? 
A. . That's correct. 
Q. And there wasn't any fog or any mist or any-
thing that interfered with your visibility 
then~ 
A. Not in the position I was on the highway." 
(R. 265) 
Exhibit 3 was introduced in evidence and identified 
as the defendant's truck which Muder was driving and 
the witness Muder testified that the damage shown there-
on was that caused in the accident, (R. 262-263). 
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Muder further testified on cross exa1nination as fol-
lows: 
'~Q. K O"\Y you stated that as you "\vere coming do,vn 
the high,Yay at a speed of forty five, where 
you state it might be as high as fifty miles an 
hour, that yon observed a light on the high-
"\Yay, a light or lights. Did you see just one 
Or t"\VO lights-? VVhat did you see~ 
A. It gave me the impression it was a small, low 
burning, dim light. 
* * * 
Q. Which way did it give you the impression 
that that vehicle on which you observed this 
small, dim light was headed~ 
A. \V. ell, after I had seen the light I could see 
that the pickup was across the lane behind 
me." (R. 267) 
"Q. Headed which way~ 
A. North. 
Q. * * * Was it headed straight north or was it 
at an angle, one way or the other~ 
A. I couldn't say positive. 
* * * 
Q. In any event, there was no lights on that ve-
hicle that were facing directly towards you, 
or in your general area~ 
A. No sir." (R. 268) 
* * * 
"Q. And you weren't blinded by the lights of any 
westbound vehicles? 
A. No sir. 
Q. And then when you were two to three hun-
dred feet away you distinctly saw a low light~ 
A. Yes sir.'' (R. 268) 
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"Q. And where did that light appear to be~ On 
what part of the highway~ 
A. Pretty close to center, I would say. 
* * * 
Q. At that time you didn't know what it was, did 
you~ 
A. I had my impression of it. 
Q. You didn't know definitely~ 
A. No, I didn't know definitely. 
Q. You knew there was something there, though~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you applied your brakes, you said, 
when you were two to three hundred feet 
away~ 
A. Yes." (R. 269) 
* * * 
"Q. Well, weren't you concerned about bringing 
your vehicle under control so that whatever 
this light might be that was up there in the 
center of the road that you could stop if need 
be~ 
A. I wanted to bring it to a stop and keep it 
under control while I was doing so, yes." (R. 
269) 
* * * 
"Q. And you had pressure on the brake pedal 
from that time up until the time you saw Mr. 
Earley, didn't you~ 
A. Yes." (R. 270) 
• * * 
"Q. * * * Now when did you first see the outline of 
a vehicle on the highway~ How far away were 
you when you saw it, saw an outline of a ve-
hicle~ 
A. I saw it I guess what you would call most 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
right, right approximately about the same 
time I sa "T the light; just a second later may-
be. 
Q. ,,~ell, how close were you to it' How far did 
you travel fron1 the time you had first ob-
served this lo'v glowing light in the middle 
of the high\\~ay until you could tell what it was 
up there on the highway' How far did you 
travel·? 
A. Oh, !-probably fifty feet." (R. 270) 
* * * 
"Q. So you 'Yere two to three hundred feet away 
"Then you first saw it and then you traveled 
about fifty feet when you could tell it was a 
vehicle up there, is that right~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. N o'v at that time could you tell where the ve-
hicle was on the highway~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, where was it~ 
A. Across my lane. 
Q. All right. How far did the front of it project 
out on to the highway~ Could you tell at that 
time~ 
A. Well, I saw, my impression was slightly over 
the yellow line." ( R. 271) 
* • • 
"Q. You knew there was a culvert there~ You 
have gone over this road thirty six times be-
fore, did you know that was in the general 
area where the creek was~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that at that time when you were 
two hundred to two hundred fifty feet away~ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you put your brake on harder at that 
time~ 
A. Yes." (R. 271-272) 
* * * 
"Q. I mean when you were two hundred to two 
hundred fifty feet away you didn't even know 
then that you could even get past that truck, 
did you~ 
A. I didn't, no. No, not positive, no." (R. 272) 
* * * 
"Q. Then you continued with the increased pres-
sure on the brake from that point down until 
you saw Mr. Earley~ 
A. Well, it may have been a little more. 
* * * 
- Q. It kept getting more all of that time~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Where did you say Mr. Earley was; how far 
from the truck when he got hit~ 
THE COURT: You mean the parked truck~ 
Q. The parked truck, not yours. 
A. Thirty or forty feet." (R. 27 4) 
* * * 
"Q. Well, it could have been as close as thirty 
feet to the parked truck and it might have 
been as far as fifty, is that correct~ 
A. That's right." (R. 274) 
* * * 
"Q. And when you first saw Mr. Earley where 
was he on the road~ 
A. The way it appeared to me it was close to the 
center of the south lane·, north lane. 
Q. Well, you mean he was about in the middle 
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of the \vest bound lane of traffic~ Is that what 
you mean~ 
A. Yes sir." (R. 275) 
uQ. \Y. ell, as you \Vere going straight dovvn the 
road \vith your lights on high beam they 
\vere illuminating all of that twenty foot strip 
of road·? There isn't any doubt in your mind 
about that, is there~ 
A. Ko. 
* * * 
Q. And yet you didn't see ~Ir. Earley until you 
got \vi thin t\venty to thirty feet of him~ 
A. No sir." (R. 276) 
* * * 
"Q. Well, when you were two hundred feet away 
you started moving over to the north half of 
the road, is that right~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And from that time on your lights, if any-
thing, would be more concentrated on the 
north half of the road than any other part 
of the road, wouldn't they~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. So for a distance of two hundred feet from 
the point of the accident, or the point where 
the truck was stopped your lights were illu-
minating very clearly all of the north half of 
the road and you were braking during all of 
that time~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. How fast were you going when you first sa\v 
Mr. Earley~ 
A ... _ ¥Y judgment on it would be around twenty 
five miles an hour." (R. 277) 
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* * * 
"Q. Now when you saw him you said you applied 
your brakes very heavily, is that correct~ 
A. Yes.'' (R. 278) 
* * * 
"Q. And you hit Mr. Earley with such force when 
you hit him that you smashed in the whole 
left front portion of that hood, didn't you~ 
A. I did, yes. 
Q. And you also damaged part of the grille~ 
A. Yes." (R. 278) 
"Q. And then after hitting him you either knocked 
or carried him from a point thirty to fifty feet 
west of the truck into the creek on the culvert 
of which the truck was stopped, didn't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. That would mean he was kno-cked or carried 
from the point of impact about thirty to fifty 
feet~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then how far after that did your truck 
travel from where the Earley truck was · 
stopped on the road' 
A. Well, I would say-I couldn't say positive on 
it. 
Q. Well, approximately' . 
A. Probably ten or fifteen feet east and off 
north, off the road. 
Q. And how far off the road' 
A. To the bottom of the embankment where it 
starts up." (R. 278-279) 
* * * 
"Q. Now part of this distance that you were 
traveling after you struck Mr. Earley you 
were in a sideward skid, weren't you 7 
A. Yes." (R. 279) 
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~~Q. • • * So that after yon hit 1\[r. Earley and 
knocked him approximately thirty to fifty 
feet your car still had enough momentum so it 
'vent into a sideward skid and skidded ap-
proximately thirty feet~ 
.. A... Yeah, off on an angle. It wasn't a straight 
slide." (R. 280) 
:\I uder testified that there was no contact at all 
between the car " .. hich he " .. as driving and the parked 
truck, (R. 280). 
~Iuder testified that there 'vas no mist, fog, or any-
thing to interfere with his visibility, (R. 265, 282), and 
that regardless of sidelights or flares he had no difficulty 
in seeing the outline of the truck at a distance of 200-
250 feet, (R. 284). 
POINTS 
The defendant contends that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. First, 
it is claimed that the Earley vehicle was unlawfully 
parked upon the highway; Second, that there were no 
flares or lights to warn of the presence of the Earley 
vehicle; and, Third, that the plaintiff unlawfully ran 
down the north side of the highway when by law he should 
have proceeded down the left side thereof. All of these 
matters merely presented questions of fact for the jury 
to consider in determining the proximate cause of the 
accident. In answer to appellant's brief the respondent 
sets forth the following points: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
I. Whether the position in which the Earley truck 
was parked on the highway at the time of the accident 
proximately contributed to the accident was a question 
of fact to be decided by the jury. 
II. Whether the absence of flares or warning lights 
on the Earley truck proximately contributed to the acci-
dent was a question of fact for the jury. 
III. Whether the action of the plaintiff in running 
down the north edge of the highway toward the defend-
ant's vehicle proximately contributed to the accident was 
a question of fact to be decided by the jury. 
IV. The position of the Earley truck on the high-
way combined with Earley's action in running down the 
north edge of the highway to warn the on coming vehicle 
did not as a matter of law proximately contribute to the 
accident. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER THE POSITION IN WHICH THE EAR-
LEY TRUCK WAS PARKED ON THE HIGHWAY AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE 
DECIDED BY THE JURY. 
The Earley vehicle was parked on the south side of 
the highway over the culvert headed northwest with the 
front end thereof about a foot south of the center line of 
the highway. The defendant claims that this constituted 
negligence under Section 57-7-165 of the Utah Code. 
It was nonetheless for the jury to determine whether such 
negligence proximately contributed to the accident. See 
4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice, 
Part 2, Sec. 2683 : 
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·· .... -\s to contributory negligence, the rule is 
that the fact that one is Yiola ting a statute or 
ordinance, at the tilne of rereiving an injury of 
"\Yhich he complains, is not conclusive so as to bar 
his recovery for the injury. In other words, while 
such Yiolation n1ay constitute negligence, in order 
that it may be available as a defense, it must fur-
ther be sho,vn that it proximately contributed to 
the accident." 
At page 19 of his brief defendant cites the California 
case of Thomson v. Bayless (1944) 150 Pac. (2) 413, 
which construed a provision of the California Motor Ve-
hicle Code exactly similar to the Utah Statute. In that 
case the California Supreme Court in affirming the 
jury's verdict, sets forth the general rule governing such 
cases, as follows : 
"It has recently been held that whether or 
not parking on the highway in violation of Sec-
tion 582 of the Vehicle Code constitutes a proxi-
mate cause of the accident where the driver of the 
car in motion might also have been negligent, is a 
question of fact for the jury if reasonable men can 
differ thereon. Inai v. Ede, 59 Cal. App. 2d 549, 
555, 139 P. 2d 76; see, also, opinion on prior ap-
peal, 42 Cal. A pp. 2d 521, 526, 527, 109 P. 2d 400; 
cf. Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 
141, 124 P. 2d 51; Mason v. Crawford, supra." 
In the case at bar the jury by its verdict found that 
the position in which the Earley truck was parked on the 
highway did not proximately contribute to the accident. 
The jury's verdict should, therefore, ·stand. 
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II. WHETHER THE ABSENCE OF FLARES OR WARN-
ING LIGHTS ON THE EARLEY TRUCK PROXIMATELY 
CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A QUESTION OF 
FACT FOR THE JURY. 
The defendant relies upon Section 57-7-191 of the 
Utah Code to show that there should be sufficient lights 
to reveal the presence of the vehicle at a distance of 500 
feet and also relies upon Sections 57-7-212 and 57-7-213 
requiring vehicles disabled upon the highway to exhibit 
flares, lanterns or reflectors at stated distances in front 
of and behind the vehicle. 
It is undisputed in this case that there were no flares 
around the Earley truck. However, the evidence clearly 
shows that the headlights on the vehicle were burning 
and that the vehicle was headed northwest upon the high-
way. The evidence further discloses that the defendant's 
driver actually saw a light in the middle of the highway 
when he was 200-300 feet away and clearly saw the out-
line of the Earley truck on the highway when he vvas 
200-250 feet away from it. Farrell Johnson, one of the 
plaintiff's witnesses, testified that he observed the lights 
on the Earley truck when he rounded the bend a half a 
mile west of the truck. The defendant's driver admitted 
that visibility was good and that as he rounded the curve 
a half a mile west of the scene of the accident he was 
able to see the lights burning in Laketown a mile away 
and at that point could clearly see the headlights on a ve-
hicle in Laketown which was parked by a pool hall there. 
The defendant's witness, Elijah C. Willis, testified that 
he lived 1000 feet northwest of the culvert on which the 
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Earley truck 'Yas parked and that 'Yhile at his ho1ne he 
observed the lights on the Earley truck as it was parked 
on the high,Yay. Other 'vitnesses 'Yho came fro1n the east 
testified that they had observed the lights on the Earley 
truck and the defendant's truck ""'hen they were a half a 
mile to the east. 
The purpose of a statute requiring lights or the plac-
ing of flares, reflectors or other devices is simply to give 
adequate 'Yarning of the presence of the vehicle. Where 
as in this case, there was actual and adequate notice of 
the presence of the vehicle the absence of flares, reflec-
tors or other types of warning lights was wholly im-
material. The defendant's driver actually saw the light 
on the Earley truck when he was 250-300 feet away and 
actually saw the outline of the Earley truck on the high-
way when he was 200-250 feet away. He, therefore, knew 
in ample time of the presence of the defendant's vehicle 
on the highway and knew that it was parked crosswise 
in his lane headed north blocking the eastbound lane of 
travel. Furthermore, in view of the testimony of other 
witnesses and particularly that of Farrell Johnson and 
of Elijah Willis the jury could very readily have found 
that the defendant's driver saw or should have seen the 
light on the Earley truck when he rounded the curve ap-
proximately a half a mile to the west, or at least when he 
was within 1000 feet of the truck. It was for the jury 
under this evidence to determine whether any negligence 
in this particular proximately caused the accident. See 
4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice, 
Part 2, Sec. 2632 : 
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"The negligence of a driver in failing to have 
proper lights is not of itself actionable, nor will 
such negligence preclude recovery for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident, if it is not the 
proximate cause of the accident; otherwise if 
such failure is the proximate cause of the acci-
dent." 
* * * 
"The failure of a vehicle to carry lights as 
required by the law is immaterial if the unlighted 
vehicle was nevertheless plainly seen, or could 
have been plainly seen by the exercise of ordinary 
care, in time to avoid a collision, * * * .'' 
The case of Duncan v. Madr·id, 101 Pac. (2) 382 
(New Mex. 1940) cited at page 24 of the appellant's brief, 
was tried in the lower court with·out a jury. The appellate 
court merely held that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the findings and decisions of the lower court. 
The case of Paulsen, et al. v. Spencer, 177 Pac. (2) 
597 (Calif.) cited at page 24 of appellant's brief specifi-
cally held that it was for the jury to determine whether 
the absence of lights on the vehicle was a proximate 
cause of the accident. The California Court in that case 
said: 
"The appellants first contend that it must 
be held, as a matter of law, that the respondent 
was guilty of negligence and that such negligence 
proximately resulted in the death of Paulsen. 
While there is some evidence indicating that the 
respondent parked his car as well off the pave-
ment as was reasonably possible under the circum-
stances, there would seem to be no question that 
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he \Yas negligent in not at least leaving a rear light 
lighted, as required by section 627 (c) of the Motor 
\"'" ehicle Code. H ou·ever, a question of fact was 
presented as to whether that negligence was a 
proxinzate ca1.tse of the death of Pa~tlsen. This is 
true because of the other circumstances which 
appear, \Yith the reasonable inferences therefrom, 
\Yhich \Yill be referred to in connection with the 
next point raised." (Italics ours) 
The other circumstances \Yere that road on which 
the accident occurred was straight and afforded a clear 
view for at least three-eighths of a mile toward the 
parked car. The court stated that it must therefore be 
presumed that the deceased had lights of the strength 
required by the vehicle code to disclose the presence of 
the unlighted vehicle on the highway and that the ques-
tion was, therefore, one for the jury. 
The Thfontana Supreme Court adopted the same 
view in the case of Ashley v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 
Pac. (2d) 53, cited at pages 24 and 25 of appellant's 
brief. There the truck was parked partially on the high-
way with no lights burning thereon either front or rear. 
In referring to the Montana statute which requires every 
motor vehicle to display two white lights in front and 
one light in the rear, the court said: 
"A violation of this statute constitutes negli-
gence. Simpson v. Miller, 97 Mont. 328, 34 P. (2d) 
528. Whether such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident or whether plaintiff was bar-
red by reason of contributory negligence of Kitt 
was a question for the jury. McNair v. Berger, 92 
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Mont. 441, 15 P. (2d) 834; Fulton v. Chouteau 
County Farmers' Co., supra." (Italics ours) 
It was for the jury in the case at bar to determine 
whether the absence of flares or other warning signs on 
or about the Earley truck proximately contributed to the 
accident. The jury found by its verdict that there was 
no contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part in this 
connection which proximately contributed to the accident. 
Under the facts of this case, there was ample evidence 
to support the jury in its finding. Its verdict, therefore, 
should not be disturbed. 
III. WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF IN 
RUNNING DOWN THE NORTH EDGE OF THE HIGHWAY 
TOWARD THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE PROXIMATELY 
CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A QUESTION OF 
FACT TO BE DECIDED BY THE JURY. 
The appellant in his brief quotes from the Utah cases 
of Reid v. Owen, 93 Pac. (2) 680, 98 Utah 50, Mingus 
v. Olsson, 201 Pac. (2) 495, and Sant v. Miller, 206 Pac. 
( 2) 719. All of these cases involve pedestrians who were 
crossing the highway and who were held to be contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law as they either did 
not look or failed to see the oncoming automobile before 
crossing its path. None of these cases are in point be-
cause the plaintiff in this case was not crossing the high-
way and was not crossing the path of the automobile. 
The plaintiff was proceeding down the north edge of 
the highway and the defendant's automobil~ until the 
brakes were applied an instant before the plaintiff was 
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struck \Yas proceeding along the south side of the high-
\Yay. It 'vas not until the brakes were applied and the car 
apparently S\Yerved to the left that the plaintiff was in 
any apparent danger, and it \Yas then too late for hin1 to 
avoid the accident as he testified that he was struck im-
mediately after he heard the screech of brakes. 
The appellant cites Section 57-7-46 of the Utah Code 
which requires a pedestrian when practicable to walk on 
the left side of the roadway facing the traffic which may 
approach from the opposite direction. The purpose of 
this statute is that a pedestrian shall so walk that he can 
see traffic which is approaching from the opposite di-
rection, and will be in no danger of being struck from 
the rear. Here the plaintiff was not struck from the 
rear and was in fact facing the traffic which was proceed-
ing in the opposite direction. As far as he was concerned 
it was immaterial that he was on the north edge of the 
road. Furthermore, it was likewise wholly immaterial 
from the defendant's standpoint. The defendant's driver 
testified that when he was 250-300 feet away from the 
Earley truck his headlights were illuminating the road 
for its entire width and that he had a clear and un-
obstructed vision ahead; that he was not blinded by the 
lights of any vehicles approaching from the opposite 
direction. The plaintiff's presence on the north edge 
of the highway should, therefore, have been discovered 
by the defendant's driver just as readily as though he 
had been proceeding on the south side of the highway. 
Furthermore, this Court has held that it is for the jury 
to determine whether the negligence of a pedestrian in 
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walking on the right hand side of the highway with his 
back to approaching traffic proximately contributes to 
the accident. See Roach v. Kyremes, ------· Utah ______ , 211 
Pac. ( 2) 181 ( 1949), where this court held: 
"Appellant first contends the court erred in 
failing to direct a verdict in his favor because re-
spondent was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law by walking in or along the right 
hand side of the highway because in so doing, 
she voluntarily placed herself in a perilous posi-
tion. In determining whether a plaintiff is con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law, the evi-
dence and all reasonable inferences therefrom 
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Considered from this standpoint, there 
is evidence that respondent and Miss Sickler were 
not walking on the main travelled portion of the 
highway but out on the west shoulder ; that they 
maintained a lookout for approaching traffic by 
glancing to the rear; that they moved farther 
over on the shoulder as automobiles approached; 
and, that they saw no light from defendant's car 
nor did they hear it approach. Under circum-
stances such as these, it cannot be said that all 
reasonable men must conclude that respondent 
failed to exercise due care for her own safety." 
See also Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 
Pac. (2d) 191. In that case the plaintiff was walking 
along the right hand side of the highway with his back 
to approaching traffic when he was struck by a vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction as he. The plaintiff 
testified that he was walking at a point about 3 feet east 
of the hard surfaced portion of the highway on the 
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gravelled shoulder, and the defendant's testimony 'vas 
that the plaintiff 'vas "~alking about 3 feet out on the hard 
surfaced road. It 'vas contended by the defendant that 
the plaintiff in thus 'valking on the right hand side of 
the road 'vith his back to approaching traffic 'vas guilty 
of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law. The court 
held that the question of contributory negligence was 
properly submitted to the jury and the jury having found 
against the defendant, the appellate court was bound 
thereby. 
See also Hooker v. Schuler, (Ida.) 260 Pac. 1027, in 
which the Idaho court held that a pedestrian walking on 
the right hand side of the highway contrary to a statute 
similar to the Utah statute was not guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, stating as follows: 
"The trial court properly submitted the ques-
tion of whether respondent's walking on the right-
hand side of the road, or the negligent manner in 
which appellant handled his car, or the existence 
of defective brakes on his car, was the proximate 
cause of the injury, and it was certainly a question 
for the jury to determine what was the proximate 
cause of the injury complained of under proper 
instructions by the court." 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that it was 
for the jury to determine whether the defendant was 
negligent in running along the north edge of the high-
way toward the approaching car and whether such negli-
gence, if any, was the proximate cause of the accident. 
The verdict of the jury clearly indicated that the sole 
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proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of 
the defendant and that there was no contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff which proximately con-
tributed to the accident. The jury's verdict on this point 
should stand. 
IV. THE POSITION OF THE EARLEY TRUCK ON THE 
HIGHWAY COMBINED WITH EARLEY'S ACTION IN RUN-
NING DOWN THE NORTH EDGE OF THE HIGHWAY TO 
WARN THE ONCOMING VEHICLE DID NOT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCI-
DENT. 
For the purpose of this appeal the court must adopt 
the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff. In this con-
nection there was evidence that the Earley truck was 
parked on the highway over the culvert headed north-
west with its front end about a foot south of the center 
line of the highway leaving the entire north half of the 
highway and one foot of the south portion of the high-
way open for traffic. The evidence was undisputed that 
the highway was straight and practically level for a 
distance of one half a mile to the west; that there was no 
fog, mist or anything in any way to interfere with visi-
bility; that the headlights on the Earley truck were 
properly burning. There was also evidence to indicate 
that the plaintiff at the time of the accident was 150 feet 
west of his truck on the north edge of the paved road as 
close as he could ·get and that it was impractical at that 
point for the plaintiff to get entirely off the oiled portion 
of the road; that there was at least 8 feet between the 
plaintiff and the center line of the highway on the north 
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side of the oiled road at the tin1e of the accident. There 
"?as the positive eYidence of the defendant's driver that 
he sa\v a lo\v din1 light about in the center of the high,va.y 
w·here he kne'v the culvert to be \Yhen he \vas 250-300 feet 
a\\~ay, and that \vhen he \vas within 200-250 feet he could 
clearly detect that the object on the highway in front of 
him from which the light was coming was a truck which 
\vas crosswise on the highway in his lane headed north 
with its front end partially over the north side of the 
highway; that defendant's driver at that time did not 
know whether he could safely pass to the north in front 
of the object and felt it advisable to bring his vehicle 
under control so that he could stop if need be. The de-
fendant 9-river's positive testimony also indicated that 
the lights on the defendant's vehicle were burning on 
high beam and clearly illuminated the highway for its 
entire width, but that the defendant did not see the plain-
tiff until he was within 20-30 feet of him. There was evi-
dence from other witnesses from which the jury could 
have determined that the defendant's driver in the exer-
cise of due care should have ascertained the presence of 
the Earley truck on the highway when he was one-half 
a mile to the west thereo.f. There was testimony concern-
ing brake marks from which the jury could determine 
at the time the brakes on the defendant's truck were first 
applied, that the defendant's vehicle at that time was on 
the south side of the road with all four wheels in the lane 
for eastbound traffic. There was further testimony 
which, if believed by the jury, would support a conclu-
sion that the defendant's driver never saw the Earley 
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truck on the highway in front of him and that its presence 
accordingly had nothing whatsoever to do with the acci-
dent. Under this evidepce the jury certainly could have 
found that the defendant's driver saw or should have 
seen the plaintiff's presence on the highway and the 
position of his truck in ample time to have stopped or 
brought his vehicle under control so as to have avoided 
the accident. 
There was evidence from one of the witnesses that 
the brake marks caused by the defendant's truck zig 
zagged across the highway. Another witness testified 
the defendant's truck made a furrow in the gravel on 
the north shoulder. The jury would thus have been en-
titled to find under the evidence most favorable to the 
plaintiff that when the plaintiff was 150 feet west of his 
truck and on the north edge of the paved road, that the 
defendant's truck was then on the south half of the paved 
road; that when the brakes on the defendant's truck were 
applied, it swerved to the north and struck the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff at a point 150 feet west of the truck and on 
the north edge of the road should not have anticipated 
any danger from the defendant's vehicle which was ap-
proaching him on the south side of the road. In view of 
the distance between him and his truck and the position 
which he occupied on the extreme north edge of the paved 
road he would have no reason to anticipate that the de-
fendant's driver would suddenly turn to the north and 
strike him or that he would apply his brakes and cause his 
vehicle to go out of control and cross to the north side 
of the road and strike him. 
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The appellant. in his brief claims that the Earley 
truck blocked one-half of the high,Yay and that Earley 
by his presence on tl1e north edge of the paved road 
blocked the other half of the highway and the only 
lane in 'Yhich the defendant's driver could have pro-
ceeded. \\~ e submit that this is not the case. There was 
150 feet bet,veen the plaintiff and his truck and there 
was 6-8 feet of road on the north side of the center of 
the highway and all of the south half of the highway up 
to the truck on which the defendant's driver could have 
proceeded without even striking the plaintiff or the truck. 
If the defendant's driver had been keeping a proper look-
out and had his vehicle under proper control, when he 
first observed the low light or earlier if the jury found I 
that he should have seen the light on the highway earlier, 
there would have been ample room on the highway be-
tween the plaintiff and his truck on which the defendant's 
truck could have been driven in avoiding the plaintiff 
and in passing around the Earley vehicle if it could not 
have come to a complete stop. 
It is further claimed by appellant in his brief that 
the plaintiff had an opportunity to avoid the accident 
at any time by stepping off the traveled portion of the 
highway. In this connection there was no reason for the 
plaintiff to step off the traveled portion of the highway 
until it was too late to avoid the accident. After all, he 
was on the extreme north edge of the paved road, and 
there was evidence that the defendant's truck was pro-
ceeding on the south half of the paved road. Earley 
testified that he heard the screech of brakes and the next 
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instant he was struck. The jury from this and other 
evidence could infer that the defendant's vehicle was 
being operated at a high and excessive rate of speed; 
that it was on the south half of the road until the brakes 
were applied when it swerved to the left and struck the 
plaintiff, who under such circumstances had no oppor-
tunity whatsoever to step off the highway and avoid the 
accident. Until the defendant's vehicle indicated that it 
was turning to the left or was going to .proceed toward 
the side of the highway which the plaintiff was occupy-
ing there was no reason for him to move further off the 
paved portion of the road. There was evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably infer that the defend-
ant's vehicle did not turn to the left until the brakes were 
applied, and that it was then too late for the plaintiff to 
avoid the accident. There is also testimony in the record 
that the plaintiff could not very well get entirely off the 
paved portion of the highway at that point and the photo 
of the highway, Exhibit No. 2, would support the plain-
tiff in this contention. 
Based upon the skid marks caused by the defendant's 
vehicle, the damage done to the vehicle, the distance it 
knocked or carried the plaintiff, and the distance of its 
sideward skid and the point where it came to rest, the 
jury could well have determined that the sole proximate 
cause of the accident was the speed at which the defend-
ant's vehicle was being opera ted and the failure of the 
defendant's employee to keep a proper lookout causing 
him to suddenly apply the brakes and throw his vehicle 
out of control and into the plaintiff. 
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The appellant at page :28 of his brief cites the case 
of Keller v. Brennenzan, (Wash. 1929) 279 J>ac. 588. In 
that case the plaintiff's truck becan1e stalled on the high-
\Yay and the plaintiff \Yas \valking near the center of the 
high\Yay \Yhen he \Yas struck by an automobile. The court 
held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence, but that case is distinguishable from the instant 
case on its facts. The plaintiff's vehicle became. stalled 
near the top of a steep grade with a sharp turn to the 
right beyond the grade. The plaintiff was in front of his 
vehicle but still not at the top of the grade when the 
defendant's vehicle came around the curve and ap-
proached the top of the grade from the op·posite direction. 
Because of the curve and the grade the defendant's lights 
did not light up the highway in front of him. and he did 
not see the truck or the plaintiff until it was too late to 
avoid the accident. In the case at bar the highway was 
straight and level for a distance of a half a mile to the 
west and there was nothing to interfere with the vision 
or view of the defendant's driver, and, as a matter of fact, 
he saw the vehicle and should have seen the presence 
of the plaintiff upon the highway in ample time to have 
a voided the accident. 
See Hanson v. Aldrich, 201 N.W. 778 (Iowa). There 
the plaintiff's vehicle became stalled on the road and the 
plaintiff hearing the defendant's car approaching from 
the rear walked a few feet directly behind his own car 
waving his arms to warn the defendant to stop, but the 
defendant struck the plaintiff causing him injury. The 
court held that the plaintiff was not guilty of contribu-
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tory negligence as a matter of law; that he had a right 
to rely on the fact that the defendant would observe 
the law of the road and turn out. The court affirmed 
a judgment in plaintiff's favor, stating that the defendant 
had ample space to pass the plaintiff and his car on the 
highway and that the plaintiff was not called upon to anti-
cipate negligence on the part of the driver of the other 
car, stating: 
"The evidence shows that the defendant saw 
the plaintiff and his car at such a distance that 
the collision could in all probability have been 
averted. The lights on the Aldrich car were in 
good condition, and disclosed objects in its path-
way at least 75 feet in advance of his car. Plaintiff 
could not know that defendant had no intention 
of stopping or turning to the left. Plaintiff had 
reason to think that he was within a zone of rea-
sonable safety." 
Considering the evidence as a whole, there was ample 
to support the jury in its conclusion that the negligence 
of the defendant was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the issues of negligence, contributory 
negligence and proximate cause were properly referred 
to the jury by the trial court; that there was ample evi-
dence on vvhich the jury could determine and did deter-
mine, that the negligence of the defendant was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiff, therefore, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
could not be held guilty of contributory negligence as a 
n1a.tter of law. The defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
were properly denied. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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